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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE ROLE OF GOVERNANCE IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT!
RAYMOND F. HOPK^S

Introduction: Linkages
"No taxation without representation" was a popular motto expressing public
dissatisfaction prior to the American Revolution. Popular government has long been
associated with economic health, while governments that appear oppressive,
exploitive or unresponsive are frequently linked to economic turbulence or failure.
From the observations of political philosophers since Aristotle to the evidence from
events in East Europe, the former Soviet Union and Africa, this point seems well
grounded.2
Indeed, the rapid changes in Eastern Europe and Africa since 1988 raise
anew the more specific question about how the character and performance of a
country's state organization affects the process of economic development.
"Democratization" has been seen by many East European leaders, for example, as a
prerequisite for ending the economic stagnation experienced under a communist,
command-style rule. Somewhat analagously, in AMca in the 1980s, the negative
impact of state policies that stifled initiative and extracted resources without
providing public goods has become a central issue. The World Bank, for example,
in a recent report. From Crisis to Sustainable Growth: A Long-Term Perspective
Study (1989) has summarized considerable literature pinpointing aspects of state
behavior in SubSaharan Africa believed to have been counterproductive to the efforts
of Afiican peoples and external donors to stimulate economic growth.
> An earlier version of this essay was prepared for the Task Force on Development Assistance and
Cooperation. See G. Edward Schuh, el.al.. International cooperation for sustainable economic
growth: The U.S. interest and proposals for revitalization (Washington: Report of a task Force on
Development Assistance and Economiv Growth, commissioned by the Board for International Food
and Agricultural Development).
2 Aristotle, for example, noted the enhanced indusuiousness of a society whose state followed
democratic principles (see Aristotle, Politics’) and Samuel Huntington argues in chapter 1 that
strong political institutions, able to absorb - thus not coercively regressing - a population's urge
to participate, are needed to shape political life as a solution to the turbulence and instability which
otherwise accompanies economic transformation. Political Order in chaniene Societies (New
Haven: Yale University Press,1968). Karl Deutsch argues that legitimacy and efficiency are
improved by the responsiveness of a government based on correction feedback that occurs when a
government's nerves are open to critieism. The Nerves of Government: Models of Political
Communication and Control (New York: The Free Press, 1963; 2nd edition, 1966, with new
introduction, ‘ The study of political communication and control, 1962-1966,’ pp. vii-xxiii).
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States and markets are not simply alternative or competing methods for
allocating scarce resources. They also represent fundamental elements of human
activity, each requiring the other and each able to stimulate or undermine the ability
of the other to achieve collective human benefits. It is in the organization and
interrelationship of these that welfare, development and equity emerge.^
Thus the key issue for understanding the role of governance in economic
development is the recognition that a responsible government, long a concern of
Charles E. Gilbert, plays an indispensable role in creating, sustaining and correcting
markets. The role may facilitate or hinder the work of markets to diffuse
technology, reward initiative, and distribute goods. While markets work at all levels
of society, since World War II their effects have been especially strong in deepening
international divisions of labor. Hence, the implications of governance address not
only household and national performance, but also global trade and development.
This explains some of the interest of industrial states in promoting improved
governance in countries around the world.
The purpose of this paper will be to propose and discuss a set of
characteristics of governance — applicable quite universally — that are conducive to
successful economic development. These qualities are esp^ially germane in cases
where efforts to reform policy or change national economic and political strategies
are underway.
Their relevance , however, is general and reflect a concern that the state act
“responsibly”. Often, in nation-states grappling with change, from former
communist regimes to disillusioned third world socialist countries, the role of
foreign assistance can be catalytic. By the beginning of the 1990s most donor
country and multilateral agencies concerned with promoting economic development
had begun to consider more explicitly and empirically the extent to which aid
allocations to promote economic development could and should take into account
and even shape the political environment of recipients.
Many citizens of democratic states support attaching "political conditionality"
to aid. From the US to the Nordic states, from Australia to Japan, donors have seen
a virtue in fostering values similar to their own in other states.^ Political
considerations for foreign aid have long been manifest in more overt diplomatic
uses, e.g. efforts to cement alliances and build support for, among other things, the
maintenance of foreign military bases and defense arrangements. In contrast,
multilateral institutions such as the World Bank are prohibited by their mandate from
interfering in the internal affairs and politics of member governments to whom they
provide development loans. Indeed, a basic principle of the system of nation states
is respect for the sovereignty of states. From this are derived rules against
intervention in the domestic affairs of recognized legitimate states.5 Nevertheless,
increasingly the bilateral and multilateral agencies that provide aid to less developed
countries — often countries with large impoverished populations — ^e now
considering how features of governmental performance assist or vitiate project and
program assistance. They care because they recognize the value in taking into
account the importance of such characteristics in calculations about what allocations
of foreign assistance will have positive results.
3 Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets (New York: Basic Books, 1977).
* Larry Diamond, “Promoting Democracy,” Foreign Policy. No. 87 (Summer 1992), pp. 25-46.
5 Stephen Kiasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective," Comparative Political Studies,
Vol. 21, No. 1 (April 1988), pp. 66-94.
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Four general qualities of government
Four general qualities of government promote economic development.
These are: (1) openness, (2) institutionalized, legitimate rule of law, (3) respect for
human dignity and (4) civic-mindedness. These four capture, I believe, a number of
attributes that have been proposed as important as conditions for economic growth.
These qualities are often associated with "democratic" government. An^ysts
concerned with "development," however, appropriately focus more on the quality of
governance than the character of the regime. In part, this is because of the mixed
consequences of increased participation on stability and productivity.® Multi-party
politics and political pluralism may encourage interest groups based on narrow
economic advantage. Without checks upon them, these can harm development.
Competitive qualities, therefore, should not explicitly be included in governance
attributes designed to be directly supportive of development. They may be
dangerous to development, at least in certain contexts even if increased political
competition enhances indirectly economic competitiveness and efficiency and
reinforces norms of responsibile governance that are directly helpful to a m^etgrowth economy. Rational choice political economists and critics of the impact of
special interests on American politics have long identified the danger of factions.
Empowering special economic or sub-national interests may well occur when a
political formula is adopted that encourages the use of power to perpetuate special
economic advantages. This often leads to unproductive stalemates.’?
Openness refers to transparency in public life. Thus expenditures by
government, the decisions and workings of government officials, except for highly
sensitive judicial and military areas, are open to public scrutiny. In addition
openness suggests that freedom of press and expression along with the right to
assemble and discuss either the elements of religion or political belief must be
tolerated. Tolerance for dissent, for debate, and for non-violent expression of
opposition is an important value enabling institutions to foster creativity, selfgenerative reform, and corrective feedback from mistaken policies and outdated
ideas. "Speaking truth to power" is essential if a state is to perform its classically
mandated functions in society such as promoting the common welfare, defending the
borders of the country and correcting market Mures. Moreover, openness can be a
self-sustaining trait in the sense that it provides an avenue for frustration to be
ventilated and dissipated. Hence, it promotes legitimacy and the encouragement of
voice rather than the more economicdly costly alternatives for a population, namely
loyal foot-dragging, exit or revolution**. Its dangers occur principally in deeply

® Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1968).
■? This danger has been noted by James Madison in his familiar Federalist Paper No. 10 (1787). In
more recent times the danger of the minority powerfully distraiing economic growth (and for Africa,
the most cited work) is argued by Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tromcal Africa (Beikeley:
University of California Press, 1981); Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nauons (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); and Theodore Lowi, Interest Group Liberalism (Norton;
1967). The rational choice perspective and limit are discussed in Grindle (1989).
* James Scott's work Weapons of the Weak (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986) that
suggests how peasants may be unable to exit physically, as refugees from Eastern Europe frequently
have, as have the educated who leap from Africa and other parts of the third world. Peasants,
nevertheless, "exit" psychologically and economically, he argues, by foot-dragging and
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divided societies — ones perhaps inevitably headed for separation as in the case of
post-1947 India, now broken into India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.? Interestingly
enough, the quality of openness has also been recognized as important in superior
performance among economic institutions, e.g. corporations. Thus studies at
business schools have suggested that organizations that were more open and had
less heirarchical structures were more adaptive and able to innovate and succeed in
response to the rapidly changing and highly technical environment of today's
world. 10
A rule of law, the second governance quality, is universally mentioned as a
condition for economic development. Laws are needed to guarantee contractual
rights among parties, and to ensure predictability and the protection of the individual
against larger, potentially predatory, institutions including the state. Often,
however, rule of law is narrowly associated with the establishment and systematic
operation of a court system. Totalitarian societies, of course, can achieve a
perverted version of this governance quality. Edicts of a tyrant, even in states too
weak to achieve totalitarian control, have been set forth as being lawful.
Clearly rule of law must mean something more than the mere presence of
officials following some due process in arriving at decisions which are then
authoritatively executed. Two qualities are crucial for the rule of law to achieve its
positive benefits for economic development First, it must be institutionalized. That
is, people must believe that the laws are to be respected and that the promulgation of
law, that is its "rule," arises from and is subject to scrutiny and criticism. Openness
helps guarantee this, coupled with an inculcation of respect for the law. An
institutionalized rule of law is one that reaches down to various economic stratas of
society and encompasses various ethnic and racial groups that may exist within a
pluralistic state. An institutionalized rule of law is one that is consistent in its
application and anchored in the common and deeply shared expectations of both
those who are specialized in law enforcement — police, courts and administrators —
as well as the population over whom the rule of law is applied.
Second, the rule of law must be legitimate. Often institutionalized and
legitimate rules of law reinforce each other. Nevertheless, legitimate rule of law
refers to its non-exploitive and non-coercive character with respect to the opinions
and culture over which it is exercised. In colonial states, for example, the rale of
law imposed by the British, French and others was effective and sufficiently
institutionalized to guarantee reasonably high probabilities of enforcement, at least
among those sectors of the society over which day-to-day control was exercised —
generally the "modem" sector - but was surely not accepted as legitimate by most of
the population. Indeed just as "taxation without representation" was an instance of a
rale of law that was not perceived as legitimate, so also, throughout many
developing countries, rales enforced by the formal, often inherited process of justice
do not create an atmosphere of voluntary compliance. Hence they do not nurture
confidence and predictability among a populace, fundamental factors to the
encouragement of economic risk-taking, the nurturance of economic institutions and
enhanced productivity.
noncompliance that undermines objectives of the state and protects themselves from economically
exploitative regulation.
? See Albert Hirshman’s classic work on Exit.Vnice and Lovaltv: Responses to Decline in Firms.
Organizations and States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).
10 Philip Slater and Warren G. Bennis, "Democracy is Inevitable," in Harvard Business Review.
Vol. 68, No. 5 (September-October 1990), pp. 167-176.
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On the one hand, therefore, an institutionalized but illegitimate rule of law
might characterize strongly authoritarian states in which capriciousness by rulers and
exploitation would stifle economic productivity. On the other hand, the extreme of a
legitimate but uninstitutionalized rule of law would create conditions of "the wild
west." In the latter case each individual would take care of her needs of security and
enforce upon others her own understanding of justice, often justice nieted out
swiftly. Such conditions tend to degenerate so that law is neither institutionalized
nor legitimate (except for the individual enforcers' preferences). The existence of a
state structure over such a situation camouflages subterfuge under which particular
individuals can use their putative positions and uniforms to extract resources in the
form of rents from other citizens.
Indeed, the rent-seeking state has a deformed form of justice and its rale of
law becomes more a pretext for extortion. Interestingly enough, this mafia-like
quality of government, found in the petty but systematic corruption of states such as
Zaire, Mexico, and even the Soviet Union, indicates that both weak and strong states
are prone to systems of justice in which the rale of law fails to achieve an
institutionalized and legitimate role in meting out fair and predictable outcomes for
society. Under such conditions officials are seldom held accountable for their
actions and graft, corruption and rent-seeking are encouraged.
Respect for human dignity is not mutually exclusive from the first two
qualities mentioned. If anything, it is an extension. Where government fosters
respect of each citizen, toleration increases and the assuredness with which one may
obtain or practice openness is increased. Furthermore, rale of law is likely to
demand certain "due processes" in which each individual's human dignity is
respected. In societies where one ethnic group sees another without such human
dignity, even sometimes as "less than human" or, more typically, where racial lines
le^ to invidious stereotyping, prospects for violence increase and respect for rule of
law and toleration of dissent are threatened. Opposition is often seen as threatening
because mutually exclusive identity structures fail to inco^rate other portions of the
society as being equally deserving and equally dignified. In a society where
peasants, for example, are regarded as backward or mindless, it is unlikely that the
agricultural economy will flourish. Allocations in these conditions often favor less
productive rural landowners or industrial sectors, i*
A view that human dignity is respected among the populace of the state, or
indeed the entire world, expands the protections of individuals, one against the
other, and at the same time enhances their empowerment to pursue wealth and other
values as a right. Governance can foster this through its basic constitutional
orientation and by implementing policies in a fashion that indicate implicitly as well
as explicitly such a recognition. Invidious distinctions between races or members
and non-members of the ^ing party are examples of governance which has failed to
nurture the capabilities and productive energies of its populace. Racial and ethnic
intolerance frequently vitiates economic entrepreneurship and coping strategies. In
the more mundane cases, economic resources become allocated on a basis of
regional or tribal preferences, where exploitation by a "new ruling class," whether
under apartheid or Marxism, acts as a drag on the spirit and respect of a citizenry.
11 Alain de Janvry, The Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin America (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1981); and Just Faaland and Jack Parkinson, "The Nature of the State
and the Role of Government in Agricultural Development," in C. Peter Timmer, ed.. Agriculture
and the State: Growth. Employment and Poverty in Developing Countries (Ithaca; Cornell
University Press, 1991).
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At the extreme, such intolerance leads to ethnic violence and the fragmentation of the
state.
The failure to nurture tolerance, mutual identity, and respect of others, both
in public policies and through educational institutions, can bear fruit decades latCT as
racial and ethnic conflicts destroy public resources and erode the framework within
which markets can operate. The deterioration of conditions in Sudan, Ethiopia and
Somalia are examples of this. The conflict in Mj^ar (Burma) between the Burmese
and Hill People similarly are part of an erosion that is closely associated with
economic deterioration. Ethnic unrest in Sri Lanka, the states of the former Soyiet
Union and Eastern European countries, including Yugoslavia, suggest similar
threats to economic progress as energies are vitiated on misplaced on unproductive
targets of frustration. Of course, exploitation is real. Wimess South Africa.
A government that nurtures respect for its fellow citizens and a common
identity among them, and that demands each person be accorded human dignity, is
not created artificially or in a short period. It is, nevertheless, a role the state needs
to undertake as its very constituitive element and to carry out in a way that is
effective, i.e. encourages the learning and inculcation of this value. Its achievement
requires that people be treated equally before systems of justice, that they be ^ven
equal access to services of the state, whether the post office, health clinic or
educational facility, that they be referred to not artificially, in terms created by the
state, e.g. as "comrade," but rather as they invite others to refer to themselves and
that they be free to form voluntary affiliations in civic society.*^
Finally civic-mindedness, the fourth governance criteria proposed, is a
demand upon the self to obey the state, and to voluntarily participate in civic
activities. A classic study thirty years ago found that the "civic" attitudes among
citizens was a strong indicator of loyalty to the state and of the institutionalization of
demands for tolerance and fair play amcxig other members of the population.'3 Civic
mindedness may be fostered by democratic formulae, which exalt participation and
competition. Among a people long exposed to authoritarian structures in educational
and workplace situations, a sense of participation and obligation to speak out or
provide correction to failures of rule of law is unlikely to occur. Building pride in a
national self-referent expands the capacity of the state to operate effectively. Doing
so without checks on the state’s policies, however, as often occurs in the heady days
following a revolution or the successful end of colonial rale, may lead to distortive
and excessive interventions by the state. In such times states operate as if they were
hospitals — designed to provide intensive care to their patients — and not as
institutions nurturing collective pride and voluntary self-reliant civic associations.
Foreign investment may also be eschewed uncritically when national selfconfidence is low. The dangers of excessive government fostered by nationalism
and national pride are clear. Nevertheless, civic-mindedness is necessary, indeed
critical, for a state to expand its capacity to tax effectively and to redistribute capital
through investments in public works and other collective goods such as research,

12 Robert Putnam (in chapter eight of this volume), for example, offers persuasive evidence that
people who come together voluntarily to pursue mutual interests, as in Italians joining choral
societies, provide a basis for expectations among the populace of an Italian state that is an
impressively accurate predictor of good governmental performance, often decades later, even more a
force apparantly than economic performance in promoting effective governance.
13 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1963).
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education, health systems and the apparatus to insure reliable domestic law and
adequate external defense. Such state contributions are much more easily sustained
when people respect the state and take pride in it. Civic-mindedness can be helped
by extern^ donors, but only as long as foreign aid is not seen as illegitimate or
contaminating.
Among the World Bank's basic data on countries, Switzerland ranks highest
in gross national product per capita.''* With two national languages, and a third
language widely used in southern cantons (Italian), one could imagine rampant civil
strife among language and regional groupings in this small country. The fact that
women received the right to vote only in 1973 might further suggest a lack of
participation and failure to extend the definition of citizen to the entire population.
An examination of the distortions created by the intervention of the state in
agriculture, perhaps the most highly subsidized agricultural system in the world,
might further lead an observer to expect this country to fail to meet some of the
criteria for positive elements of governance promoting economic development.
Clearly this is not the case. Voting participation in Switzerland is low often
because consensus is high. Habits of participation among women, while recent in
formal terms, show progressive trends. Voting is by and large highest among the
younger generation who have acquired a heightened sense of civic identity and
internalize more a demand upon themselves to participate in elections. Furthennore,
the Swiss have had a sense of common national pride for a long and emotionally
deep period. Such pride has overridden other potentially divisive elements of the
society. Aside from business and banking affairs, the work of the government has
been manifestly transparent, as have the public elements of social and economic life.
Rule of law has been an exemplary feature of the society. It has been a symbol of
fairness and respect for all. Indeed it serves as a nurturing ground for meeting the
needs of the world's state system. The headquarters of the League of Nations was
located here and currently its buildings, the Palace of Nations, houses much of the
United Nations. With Switzerland's long service to international causes, including
the League of Red Cross Societies, the notion of respect for human dignity is an
honored tradition. Finally, civic-mindedness, that is pride in the physical
appearance of one's country and in the responsibility of each citizen to look after the
laws and to maintain their private and public places, is well established. Swiss civic
mindedness reflects the pride of the individual in the state and the dedication to its
success as a corporate body, while at the same time demanding a strong role for the
private sector and for regulation rather than exploitation of markets.

Agriculture, development and governancei^
Thanks to the large role played by agriculture in developing countries, how
governance affects agriculture is crucial to economic development. Especially irt
states with GNP per capita below $600, the agricultural sector is usually the largest
source of employment and food the largest household expenditure. It is appropriate,
therefore, to give special attention to ways in which governance affects the

World Bank, World Develontnent Report. 1992: Development and the Environment
(Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1992).
15 I want to acknowledge the influence and help of Peter Timmer, Waller Falcon, and others who
attended the Marbach Conference on "The Role of Agriculture in Economic Development,"
September 1989, in Oeningen, Germany.
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performance of national food and agricultural systems.
State policy intervention in agriculture has a long tradition. Economic
historian Peter Lindert presents evidence to show a changing role for agricultural
policies in the course of economic growth, i* In early modern European and
contemporary developing countries, most often agriculture experience net toation,
in modem industrial states, in contrast, governments generally subsidize agriculture.
This pattern does not arise, Lindert finds, fi-om economic rationety (usually) but
from political and economic forces ascendent at a particular time in a nation s
history.
•
A traditional political economy analysis, in fact, readily explains this
evolution of agricultural policy fiom exploitation to subsidization. The dynamics are
more complex, however. Thus, theories of pure rational choice we inadequate, at
least as elaborated by some economists, i.e. the view that policy outcomes are
essentially the result of success by a self-interested pursuit by the strongest, most
organized social groups.*^ Over time, for example, we can see how the purposes
that powerful forces sought from state action have often been divergent from
consequences.!* Often there are perverse and unintended consequences of state
action for agriculture. In addition, causality is interactive. Hence, the very
evolution of the state itself is closely linked to the development of agriculture and the
effects that agricultural policies have upon it. Hence, there is a dynamic.
Governance and agricultural performance in a society act over historical periods as
endogenous but independent variables in a country's history, operating in a nonrecursive fashion — a point implicit in most analyses of economic historians and
socidl scientists
Anthropologists, furthermore, have closely linked the expansion of
governing institutions -- from those of minimalist governments to complex, modem
state systems - with changes in agricultural production. The n^ to regulate maricet
activity and resolve land disputes for settled agriculturalists, for instance, is
postulated as the basis for the rise of African feudal-type systems.20 Likewise, the
centralization of state power and national policies in the modem era is firmed to
changes in agriculture.21 Indeed, state financing for agricultural modernization and

16 Peter Lindert, "Economic Influences on the History of Agricultural Policy," in C. Peter Timmer,
ed.. Agriculture and the Slate: Orowth. Emnlovment and Poverty in Developing Countnss (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1991).
17 E.g. Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations - Economic Growth. Stagflation aod
■Social Rigidities (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).
1* Charles Tilly, ed.. The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1975): Andrew Coulson, Tanzania: A Political Economy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1982).
19 Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorshin and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the
Making of the Modem World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967); Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic
Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1962).
20 See M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, eds., African Political Systems (London: Oxford
University Press, 1940); and Lucy Mair, Primitive Government (Baltimore: Penguin, 1962), pp.
29-31.
21 See Geoffrey Barraclough, The Crucible of Europe (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1976); and William Cochran, The Development of American Agriculture: A Historical Analysis
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979).
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the expansion of markets, some argue, played the critical role in the modernization
of Europe and the expansion of the European state System.22
Agricultural transformation, not surprisingly, is also seen as essential for
successful economic development in late-developing countries, such as Turkey, and
very late developers, such as SubSaharan African countries.23 Thus agricultural
transformation may be regarded as central to economic development. In addition it
plays a critical role in enhancing or undermining state authority.24 Given this
centrality, a key question arises. How can differences in governance shape state
intervention in agriculture in ways that enhance economic development?

Purposes and consequences of agricultural policies
In different historical and agronomic situations, states formulate different
agricultural policies. They differ because they seek different goals and choose
varying instmments of policy. It is difficult, of course, to be certain about the real
purposes of states, as opposed to the merely stated ones. Furthermore, while
formal, stated policies are generally accessible to historic or economic interpretation
drawing upon explicit legal actions and recorded state expenditures, the actual
implementation of policies and the utilization of state funds may vary considerably
from those formally stated. This is particularly true in societies in which state
capacity is weak, that is a "soft" state exists, to use Myrdal's term.25 Throughout
contemporary SubSaharan Africa, for instance, where countries have a dismal
record in agricultural performance in the 1970s and 1980s, policies for regulating
markets, subsidizing agricultural inputs, fixing prices, and even creating nutritional
safety nets expose a wide gap between official policy and actual performance. What
allows this to happen over an extended period? First, the absence of openness and
legitimate rale of law in many states has prevented protests and corrective feed-back
to expose this disjunction between stated goals and actual consequences for
producers. Second, failures in agriculture can undermine the civic-mindedness of
farmers marginalized or exploited by policies that backfire.
The effectiveness of policy instruments may thus be highly limited in periods
of nascent state formation. Although rural populations often lack organization and
appear vulnerable to the interests of the powerful, they nonetheless may pose a

Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modem World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the
European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press, 1974); Tilly,
1975; and Michael Tracy, Agriculture in Western Europe; Crisis and Adaptation since 1880
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1982,2nd edition).
23 See A. Adnan Akay, From l.andlordism to Capitalism in Turkish Agriculture. Working Paper
#12 (Milton Keynes, U.K.: The Open University, 1988); John W. Mellor, Christopher L. Delgado
and Malcolm J. Blackie, eds.. Accelerating Food Production in sub-Saharan Africa (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).
24 Bruce Johnston and Peter Kilby, Agriculture and Structural Transformation (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1975); Raymond F. Hopkins, "Food Security, Policy Options and the Evolution
of State Responsibility," in F. Lamond Tullis and W. Ladd Hollis, eds.. Food, the State, and
International Political Economy (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), pp. 3-36, and
"Political Calculations in Food Subsidies," in Per Pinstrup Andersen, ed.. Food Subsidies in
Develoning Countries (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), pp. 107-126.
23 Gunnar Mvrdal. Asian Drama: An Inoiiirv into the Poverty of Nations (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1968).
22
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formidable obstacle to stale manipulation. This seem equally tme in Africa in the late
twentieth century or in Europre in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries-^* The
disjunction between "good" intentions of policy and perverse consequences can be
attenuated when the rural sector has the benefit of an open society, when they are
accorded respect and when law guarantees them equal rights, then policies Aat hurt
the rural sector and small producers and represent opportunities for official rentseeking will be less sustainable.
The historically dynamic process of the role of the state in agriculture moves
from purposes to policy choices to implementation and, finally, to consequences.
This dynamic is pervasive in the history of relations between the state and
producers, merchants, and consumers. On the one hand, cases exist in which the
state has used its resources to promote efficient agriculture, for example, through
provision of collective goods, with results that are positive for both economic and
non-economic values.^t Several Asian states are such cases. On the other hand,
states with weak structures and the absence of responsible governance can exploit
agriculture, thus undermining growth opportunities and alienating segments of
society.^
• , •
A focus on consequences, therefore, rather than policy stipulations is
important both for development and especially for the agricultural sector. An
institutionalized, legitimate rule of law is conducive to this consequential approach to
agricultural development.However, the emergence of higher economic
productivity in some states, thanks to industrialization, has led to Ae diffusion of
demands for a broader, welfare role for states, a role that exceeds ability.
Human dignity as a quality of governance has a connection also. Such value
requirements limit rights to regulate markets solely in the interest of efficiency and
social profitability (if they ever could); they also must redistribute social values to
insure some degree of equity or justice.^o In the last several centuries, responsibility
for administering to the needs of weak and vulnerable people has shifted from the

26

See Faaland and Parkinson, in Timmer, 1991; James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Goren Hyden, Uiamaa (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1980): and Harvey Glickman, ed.. The Crisis and Challenge of African Development (New
York: Greenwood Press, 1988).
27 For purposes here, the outcomes of state agricultural uansactions are referred to both in terms of
beneftrs that are directly economic — in the sense that they yield monetized effects whose net
benefits and costs can theoretically be assessed using standard economic accounting methodologies and in terms of non-economic benefits, which include important aspects of human behavior, such
as loyalty to the government, voluntary compliance with policy, national self-esteem and rectitude,
and other values. These are not monetized directly. Even shadow prices for such values would be
hard to calculate since their manifestations in society often occur in step-level events. Changes in
such values, however, are conceptually discrete movements. For example, government legitimacy
can vary by degrees, but changes in government legitimacy outside revolutionary situations are not
readily measurable.
28 Alberto Valdes, "Export-led Growth: What Role for Agriculture?" in C. Peter Timmer, ed.,
Agriculture and the .State: Growth. Employment and Poverty in Developing Countries (Ithaca;
Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 1-28.
29 Bruce F. Johnston and Peter Kilby, Agricultural and Structural Transformation; Econamk
Strategies in I.ate. Develoning Countries (New York: Oxford University Press. 1975), p. 474.
30 See Arthur Okun, Equality and Efficiency: The Big Trade Off (Washington; The Brookings
Institution, 1975).

THE ROLE OF GOVERNANCE IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

111

private to the public sector. Thus, the welfare state, with its plethora of programs
that provide citizens minimum guarantees of goods and services, has emerged as a
manifest result of this shift. Further it is a concrete expression of material justice
that respects individual human dignity (a "liberal" value to be sure). Thus in the
modem, "well-governed" state, economic development naturally provides citizens
with minimum guarantees of goods and services. As there is an expansion of the
capacity of the state to do this, a result of natural shift in the size and capacity of the
economy, it can do this better. It is not necessarily, therefore, a change in the
desiderata of responsible governance.
Food price policy in developing countries has been particularly affected by
this shift. To guarantee access to basic foodstuffs and augment the household
income of those extremely poor, many states have adopted such measures as fixed
prices or subsidy policies. Ethical considerations, arising from the very fabric of
society itself, lead to this redistribution on behalf of the poor.si Most recently,
governmental concern for dignity of all, including the poor, has manifested itself
(even in very poor states) in such initiatives as the UNICEF proposal for
"adjustment with a human face" and the World Bank's effort to achieve "food
security" in Africa. Such policies are not without economic costs, however, the
frequent trade-offs between equity and efficiency, between short- and long-term
consequences, and between economic and non-economic values, become especially
poignant in cases where government capacity is already constrained by slow rates of
economic development.
Political economy considerations in the evolution of agricultural
policy
Economists frequently criticize government policy that distorts markets.
They argue that such interventions lead to non-Pareto optimal outcomes, reduce
efficiency, slow the expansion of the production frontier, promote disincentives, and
protect the unduly privileged. Such criticisms arise not only from neoclassical
assumptions from which most economists approach social analysis but also from a
genuine concern to seek better social welfare outcomes from government
intervention. Market failures, exploitative government behavior, and policies
encouraging stagnation rather than economic growth seem pathological from this
perspective. To account for such policy failures, economists frequently blame
"politics."
Recently, analyses of "political economy" have sought to interpret the
development and change of policy in various historical contexts.^z At least three
alternative "ideal types" exist in political economy writings. Let me outline these to
suggest how different roles for the state can affect the pattern of governance and
economic development especially in the agriculture sector.
State as Arena. In the first idSil type, political economy sees the state as
an arena for competing interest groups. Call this Model I. It is the most prevalent
analytical model for describing causes of government action. Powerful interests,
often urban based, as in a white collar salariat class, or grounded in powerful
31 Robert Chambers, Rural Development: Putting the Last First (London: Longman, 1983); Jean
Dreze, and Amartya Sen, Hunger and Public Action (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
32 E.g. Martin Staniland, What is Political Economy? (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1985);
and Robert Bates, Bevond the Miracle of the Market (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1989).
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landowners have partial or complete control over the instruments of the state and use
them to advance their own interests.33 For these powerful groups, the only trade-off
is between short- and long-term gain; they otherwise promote their group's rational
choice strategies for state action, which will only coincidentally promote the interests
of the society as a whole.
State as Actor. A second vision of the state used by political economists
is a model of the state as an actor in its own right. The clan of tribal societies, the
royal families of the feudal ages, and the modem bureaucratic state with its cadres of
officials are examples of the personal state. Here the rational calculator of costs and
benefits is based on maximizing state power and the income of its officials. Such
calculations are, of course, constrained by the pliability of the state's subjects and
the technology the state can use to enforce its will. The basic calculus, however,
derives from the interests of those running the state itself, whether royalty, a
privileged class, or an entrenched bureaucracy.
Examples of the state as self-interested actOT range from the reign of France's
Louis XrV with his diffidence towards those outside his state ("I'Etat c'est moil") to
the kleptocracy of Zaire. Activities of rent-seeking states have been caustically
describe by citizenries of countries ranging across the ideological spectrum. The
Soviet Union, under Glasnost, has print^ numerous complaints about management
both in agriculture and in officialdom generally. Such popular complaints about
state-controlled exploitation are widely reported in the literature on dependency in
Latin Amaica and Africa; attitudes with the same valence are voiced more gently in
criticisms of the "heavy hand" of government expressed by the American farm
population.34
State as Developer. In the third "ideal" model of a state's role in society
described by political economists, the state is focused on building social capacity.
Weak states seen through this model seek power but not as an end in itself, as in the
case of Model II. Rather, here the state attempts to build support and discover
policies that will best serve purposes required for survival of national sovereignty.35
According to this ideal-type model, the key distinction among states and their
policies arises from the state's capacity — as ranked on a continuum from a weak (or
soft) state to a strong (or hard) one. For the state to be an agent of development (and
other human goals)it cannot be ephemeral and elusive; it must be tough and
effective. The writ of state authority itself is the issue in question.3® Often a weak
state's capacity extends no further than the capital city or the personal friendships of
top leaders. 'To act as a “builder,” a state’s “strength,” therefore, determines the
degree to which it can be effective. Excessive intervention, exceeding capacity,
undermines economic strength and eventually political control. Figure 1 summarizes
these three ideal type models of the role of the state in policy making.

33 For a discussion of urban bias, see Michael Lipton, Why the Poor Slav Poor: A Study of
Urban Bias in World Deyelopment (London: Temple Smith, 1977).
34 Williard W. Cochran, The Deyelopment of American Agriculture: A Historical Analysis
(Minneapolis: Uniyersity of Minnesota Press,1979).
33 Stephen Krasner, "Soyereignty: An Institutional Perspectiye,” Comnaratiye Political Studies
(April 1988), pp. 66-94.
36 See Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Hayen; Yale Uniyersity
Press, 1968).
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FIGURE I: Three "Ideal Types" of State/Society Relations

MODEL I: STATE AS ARENA
Groups form outside government, based on rational interest calculations, and seek to
influence policy.
Variant A:
Competitive, pluralist system: multiple groups, changing alliances, and failures of
public interest Failures arise from divisible benefits that provide incentives to some
groups (e.g. farm organizations) to pressure for policy preference, while more
diffuse, larger groups (consumers) are less active due to the problems that collective
benefits offer no selective incentives to mobilize.
Variant B:
Non-competitive, class-dominated situation in which a group, largely external to
state officials (e.g., bourgeoisie, salariat, ethnic groups, etc.), dictate policies that
systematically disadvantage one or several other groups. Little or no advantage
accrues to public officials.

MODEL H: STATE AS ACTOR
State officials act to maximize their values (wealth, power, safety, affection, etc.).
If the state has a high discount value, its leadership usually self-destructs.
Its features are rent-seeking, bureaucratic self-protection, and extortion by
individuals. The state is seen by itself and others as competing with society to
maintain the privileges of the state office holders. If the state has a low discount
rate, leaders may move toward a broader incorporation of popular interests with state
interest - a possible transformation, especially in "weak" states, toward a Model HI
type.

MODEL Iff: STATE AS DEVELOPER
The goal of strengthening nation-state desiderata of security, growth, and welfare
are maximized.
Weak states, typical among LDCs, give high priority to inculcating habits of
compliance and improving the probability of enforcement. Security, particularly
domestic, is a centi^ issue. As the state as agent becomes stronger, its capacity and
interest in serving national goals moves it to allocate more resources or allow more
risk in policies aimed at economic growth and, eventually, welfare. Weak states that
prematurely give high priority to economic growth and welfare frequently fail.
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In examining the extent any given state’s governance reflects each of these
three “ideal” types, a distinction between formal, "de jure" but ineffective states and
stronger "de facto" states is particularly apt A number of writers have alluded to the
inability of states, especially in Africa, to adopt policies that genuinely regulate the
economy — that demonstrate capacity beyond control over imports and exports.
Even in the trade control realm, smuggling can be a major element allowing
agriculture to escape state regulation.3^ it is important to recognize that even in
countries where states represent powerful forces of society, such as the United
States, or of a powerful organization in society, such as the Communist Party in the
former Soviet Union, state policy is not solely in control. Other factors, particularly
implementation problems and reactions of individual producers or consumers,
frequently lead to jwlicy outcomes quite different from the consequences expected or
predicted by sophisticated analysis. In these conditions, actions by the state to
intervene in agriculture, whether to support producers or consumers, or to stimulate
and to redistribute wealth, may also represent a series of trials and errors in policy
formation.

State intervention in agriculture and opportunities to enhance
governance
The history of agricultural policy in various countries allows us to analyze
how the ideal type distinctions above help us account for the evolution of policies,
either across cases or over particular time periods in a country. Further, we can
examine the purposes served by state intervention and how different ideal
approximations and locations on capacity, hierarchy and openness may affect
agricultme policy. States as actors for themselves (Model II), for example, are
aggrandizing in character but frequently have short-term successes and long-term
failures. Perhaps the Philippines under Marcos fits this pattern. A state acting as an
^ena for competing groups (Ideal Model I) may become captured by narrow
interests, whether of powerful landlords or military officers, as in Argentina, which
may lead to important policy distortions and to lost opportunities for the economy as
well as disaffection of the population.^* Where organized agriculture and a political
elite overlap, as in Kenya and the Ivory Coast, policies favorable to agriculture (if
not rural society in general) are also possible. The third vision, the state as wouldbe entrepreneur, may best account for states that intervene in society primarily to
bring order and some semblance of control over agriculture; unfortunately this
purpose in weak states may be highly transient and hard to implement; Tanzania is
such a case. Since the state is not deeply institutionalized — its leadership and/or
circumstances change fairly quickly — such a state might also be opportunistic.
Consider further that the state's search for optimizing behavior takes place
under high uncertainty. Ironically, because weak states are not anchored in tradition
or legal formalities, they may be more erratic in the policies they follow, but they are
also more influenced by policy advice given by economists. Policies of developing
countries, especially those in Africa, frequently fit this model. The advice of
agricultural policy analysts to advance development might be most critical in weak
states; it has the greatest oppxjrtunities to restructure agriculture, particularly after a
37 See Hyden, 1980; Michael Bratton, "Beyond the State," World Polities, vol. 41, no. 3 (April
1989), pp. 407-430.
3* Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1968).
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revolution or foreign conquest — for example, consider the effects of land reforms in
Japan, Taiwan, or China.
Six purposes specific to agriculture seem to explain historical evolution in
agricultural policy and relate to openings during which shifts toward enhanced
governance can occur. Government intervention has nearly always involved some
mixture of these purposes (outlined as broad goals). The six purposes of the state in
asserting governance in agriculture are outlined below. Consequences of policy to
achieve such purposes have also shaped the future capacity of the state for
undertaking policies more broadly (i.e. in all sectors of the society). Short-sighted,
unsuccessful interventions can harm both the state and agriculture. The success of
the economic transformation of agriculture and the development of national loyalties
and institutionalization of desirable features of governance, e.g. ones conducive to
economic development, are all deeply interrelated as multiple consequences of
evolving policy, in this instance in the agricultural sector.
(1) Extract Resources from Agriculture. The first purpose, classic for selfserving or rent-seeking states (Model fi), is to extract resources from the agricultural
sector for the purpose of state maintenance, including guaranteeing a high standard
of living among official or royal classes. Since such extraction from the production
or exchange of agricultural products serves only the purpose of redistributing wealth
to office holders and central state authorities, it represents the purest case of
exploitation. Such action is the functional equivalent of mafioso-style extortion in
the private sector. The government's treatment of French peasants prior to the 1789
revolution is a classic instance of such a purpose dominating state policy. Zaire in
the 1970s is another instance.39 In Model III, extracting resources from agriculture
may be linked by expenditure policies to more altruistic intentions and even
consequences.
(2) Expansion of the State. The state intervenes to expand its connections
throughout society. The expansion of the state, for good or ill, requires replacing
local fiefdoms and baronies with the imprint of central authority. States thus devise
policies that require low investment in personnel and seek to represent central
authority as a positive force in the life of the peasantry.^ Capitalist agriculture, for
example, required centralized authority over local manor systems or tribal
economies; the substitution of state regulations for such systems made possible the
encouragement of capitalist practices. The state acted to assert its authority,
however, rather than to base its policies on a theory of economic development This
assertion of authority itself was most often the core purpose for such action.^i
(3) Protect Agriculture as a Resource. At times the state has intervened to
put agriculture on a competitive basis with other economic sectors. By nature,
agriculture is a risky business. Climatic forces make crop yields uncertain,
ftotection of land tenure rights and fair marketing arrangements for the often poor
and disorganized farmers depends on laws and government. Producers who

39 Scott, 1985; Thomas Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).
40 Harold J. Laski, The Rise of European Liberations (London: Unsrin Books, 1938); Barrington
Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorshin and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967); Michael
Bratton, “Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associadonal Life in Africa,” World Politics 41. no.
3 (April 1989), pp. 407-587.
41 Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1975).
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provide the physical labor in agriculture, as distinguished from large landowners and
managers, frequently have little power over the affairs of a state. Such numerous
but disorganized elements of society lack the free time or direct rewards to organize
and pay the cost of collective bargaining with the state.-tz The state aiming at
development, however, can serve to secure socially efficient collective tenefits for
such important productive groups, which the "free rider" problem in politics would
otherwise cause to be neglected.
(4) Promote Economic Development. The state undertakes various
measures to stimulate economic development, such as investment in agricultural
research, encouragement of new technology, or greater guarantees of profitability to
producers taking risks or investing more of their own labor. This role of the state is
the classic one assumed by most economists (given the normative assumptions
within which most of their work is cast). With this purpose in mind, analysts
carefully try to assess the optimal benefit-cost ratios of various government
investments to maximize efficiency among producers, lower marketing costs, and
alleviate uneconomical fluctuations in demand and unemployment among the poor.
Open, strong and participatory states are likely to evolve policies that balance market
efficiency with state exchange guarantees and investments. This is a result of the
information feed-back and decision flexibility of such states.
(5) Improve Welfare of the Poor. Often cited as a goal of government
policy is the promotion of equity and the meeting of human needs. Subsidies
targeted to the hungry poor, absorption of the adjustment costs for those moving out
of agriculture, and other state-funded compensatory actions may not have positive
rates of return on investment, but are justified by basic ethical considerations and,
secondarily, perhaps by the goal of state survival as a national, social instrument
(see the purpose of political stability below). Such interventions to assist the ptwr
might be a drag rather than a spur to general economic development Egypt and Sn
Lanka, for example, have been cited as cases where the burden of food subsidies,
equaling 10 to 20 percent of total government revenues in the 1970s, was, in terms
of economic growth, a long-term negative factor. While industrialized states, such
as the United States, Europe, and other OECD countries may well afford "welfare
state" policies that include targeted food guar^tep through programs such as fo^
stamps, institutional feeding, and direct distribution, their costs as a portion of the
government's budget are modest. Such redistribution, however, weighs heavily on
states with lower incomes, less efficient economies, and with a large portion of the
population employed in agriculture.^^ Some effort, however modest, may be
important to signal a respect for human dignity and maintain respeaor legitimacy for
the state. Hence, the next point.
(6) Promote Political Stability. Even from a quite strict economic
perspective, political stability, however difficult to estimate, is worth some economic
benefit. Maintenance of political authority reflects, in part, the political ties, both
personal and ideological, between state leadership and the rural sector of the
economy. Thomas Jefferson regarded the agricultural ethic as the basis of American

« Robert Dahl, Modem Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 5571; Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965);
Charles E.Lindblom, Politics and Markets (New York Basic Books, 1977).
■♦3 Per Pinstrup-Andersen, ed.. Food .Subsidies in Developing Countnes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1988).
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democracy — an argument that has supporters even two centuries later.'**'*
Analogously, agriculture as an embodiment of state virtue has flourished under Felix
Houphouet-Boigny, of Cote d'Ivoire. Houphouet proclaims himself the country's
"number one peasant." Emotional ties, therefore, can bind agriculture and the state
in ways that sustain national character, project cultural values, and bolster political
stability. These cultural forces can emotionally distort the "rational choice" template
often placed upon government intervention.'*^
In summary, the state intervenes in agriculture usually to accomplish one or
several of these six purposes. In Model I the state as an arena for powerful "private"
forces establishes public policy aimed at advancing their interests. Generally,
agricultural interests “lose” priority to industrialization but “win” among advanc^
industrial states, as in Europe, Japan and the U.S. In Model II the state is a
maximizer on behalf of itself as an actor — that is, it maximizes the private interests
of officialdom. Agricultural interests invariably lose. In Model in the state is also
an actor, but one motivated by sovereignty goals and limited by missing
information, uncertain popular loyalties, and ineffectual instruments. Agriculture
has its best chance to have supportive policies pursued by the state during
industrialization; Korea is arguably an example. The three models are not mutually
exclusive; they do, however, organize distinctive analytical elements to explain the
actions of a state. In any actual case, some mixture of all three models is likely. In
most cases, however, one or another model will prove more illuminating and
predictive of state action than others.

Strategies that support economic-promoting governance
Sections III and IV, focusing on the state in agriculmre, laid out some
general ways that governance factors affect societal performance and agricultural
development. Let us return, in conclusion, to the qualities of the state outlined in
section II, i.e. openness, rule of law, human dignity and civic-mindedness. These
qualities, while not unrelated to democracy, are not simply the equivalent of
democracy. In most cases these qualities will be enhanced by democratic features
such as participatory institutions, decentralization, and certain democratic techniques
(e.g. elections, multi-party system, and checks and balances between the different
branches of government). The qualities I proposed, however, can exist at least
somewhat independently of national democratic institutions. They reside most
fundamentally as part of and in relation to a broader fabric of society. The three
ideal-type models proposed in section in reflect this point. Short-term mechanical
fixes, such as new "constitutions," or elections, are less salient for sustaining stable
governance, therefore, than maintaining a culture of governance properties
throughout organizations in civil society. At independence, for example, African
states almost universally adopted democratic forms of government, only to see these
institutions transformed into one-party states or military dictatorships within a
decade. Latin American countries are famous for the number of constitutions which
** Donald F. Hadwiger and Ross Talbot, "The United States: A Unique Development Model," in
Raymond F. Hopkins, Donald J. Puchala and Ross B. Talbot, eds.. Food. Politics, and Agricultural
Development (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979); Grant McConnell, The Decline of Agrarian
Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952).
*5 See Merilee Grindle and John Thomas, "Policy Makers, Policy Choices and Policy Outcomes,"
Policy Science, vol. 22 (1989), pp. 213-248; and David Potter, People of Plenty (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1954).
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they have adopted over the years, few of which represented the underlying or real
constitutions, that is the authoritative expectations of the population with respect to
order and justice. A similar disjuncture existed in the Soviet Union and East
Europe.
. j ,
u r
•»
In examining the role of governance in economic development, tneretore, it
is important not to look at the formal institutions which one might recommend to a
country as a part of an economic assistance package. Democracy may be good, but
it is not a panacea. Furthermore, its artificial insertion may only lead to cynicism
and an innoculation against the virtues that democracy can bring.
The second facet of the four qualities outlined in section II is their enabhng
capacity for the state. They often promise to strengthen state capabilities antWice
versa. Weak states are incapable of regulating and sustaining markets.
frequently fail to resolve inequities and distortions that markets can allow.
Monopolistic trading may be outlawed by the state, but state monopolies oft®**
behave as badly or worse than private monopolies (especially regulated ones) wlule
state controls to protect parastatd monopolies encourage illegal paraUel markets that
bring risk premium income to the least deserving. Hence weak states that ^tempt
strong policy intervention frequently inculcate contempt not resjtect for human
dignity and nourish a culture of personal-mindedness not civic-mindedness.
Furthermore, autocratic states exacertete these tendencies and undermine respect for
human dignity as coercive force becomes the increasingly used method of law
enforcement. Thus these four underlying, basically cultural qualities are keys to
good governance.
...
.
u
u
A major factor in determiiung what state action is likely to advance test mc^e
described qualities of governance is the size, strength and terntorial extension of the
government. We can see the expansion of governance institutions, from those of
minimalist governing institutions to complex modem state systems — have occurred
in strong correlation with changes in the economy. The shift from an agricultural to
an industrial society, from rural to urban life, have all allowed state apparad to
expand in scope. Indeed such state expansion was necessa^ and ineviteble, I
argued earlier, in order to govern the more complex, industrial and world-wide
economic activities that have ensued. State financing for economic development,
particularly for agricultural modernization in developing countries, and the
expansion of markets which requires transportation infrastructure, rules of
marketing and the enforcement of transparancy or openness in exchange, played a
critical role in the modernization of Europe.^
Economic development, therefore, cannot do without the state nor the
important functions that government plays. However, a state in which govem^ce
is dominated by special interests, which interferes and disrupts markets and which
nurtures incivility and eventually violence among its population, leads a raunt^
towards economic ruin rather than productivity. The economic crises of Africa in
the 1970s and 80s, many of which are clearly asscteiated with the failures of
governance, provide the most poignant and empirical evidence of this proposiuon.^^
To be effective, governments must be supported by the attitudes and cultural
46 Charles Tilly, ed„ The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton
University Press. 1975); Michael Tracy. Agriculture in Western Euioto; Crisis and AdapiaUon
■Since 1880.2d ed. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1982).
47 Richard Sandbrook, The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1985); World Bank, From Crisis to Sustainable Growth;
Perspective Study (Washington: World Bank, 1989).
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attributes described in section II above and must, in response to them, do more than
regulate maricets in the interest of efficiency and social profitability. Governments
must redistribute social values to assure some degree of equity and justice in the
society. Such government action is crucial to the outward appearance of recognizing
the human dignity of all citizens and for promoting the legitimacy and
institutionalization of a rule of law.
Assessments of economic development and evaluation of aid projects
fiiequently fail to take into account the externalities of a project or program upon such
qualities of governance. Normal rates of return calculation cannot capture the kind
of benefits to good governance or responsible government which attending to the
principles of openness, mle of law, respect for human dignity and civic-mindedness
require. Moreover, these qualities which have a less "western" aspect to them are, I
submit, more likely to be adaptable to a variety of societies, including those in which
formal institutions of elections, competitive political parties and narrow pluralist
interests (often lobbying or pressuring government) are not accepted as part of the
definition of civic virtue. Consider that authoritarian structures such as the Catholic
Church have promoted in Latin America a doctrine of human dignity that demands
rules of law and progressive redistribution. The king in Thailand similarly provides
cultural and practictd support for at least some of these qualities. Such cases and
others offer a strong argument for pressing for these deeper cultural elements in
governance, ones which pervade all social institutions —the family, the school, the
workplace and the religious bodies. Their attainment can provide a fi’amework
within which responsible government and good governance can evolve and in which
the functions of the state will be channeled to facilitate greater productivity by these
qualities of good governance.

